This article presents a broad overview of U.S. economic history which identifies a next stage of feminist economic transformation. My three-stage historical framework shows that a variety of forces are currently operating to bring about the degendering of the values, institutions, and practices of capitalist patriarchy, changing the organization and allocation of both paid and unpaid work in dramatic ways. These changes are leading to the healing of individuals, male-female relationships, and economic and social institutions, constituting a revolutionary new stage of feminist-inspired change.
and competing with other men in the economy for money, status, and power. Femininity, in contrast, comes to mean being receptive and submissive to men, and nurturing and caring, especially in the home sphere. Women who did paid work, most of them single, did it as a temporary stage before marriage; they were segregated into a subset of low paid, low status "women's jobs." Feminist activity in this stage involved unpaid volunteer work in the public/civic sector, including a struggle for suffrage based on the belief in women's distinct caring and nurturing qualities.
In Stage 2, married women entered into paid work in large numbers, and women successfully fought to gain entrance into "men's jobs." Stage 2 feminist activity focused on achieving equality with men, by gaining access to areas of social, economic, and political life previously restricted to men, and thus to the power men had monopolized. Earning as much money as men became the key goal, and embracing the masculine competitive ethos the means to achieve it.
Femininity, as defined in Stage 1, and the home-centered work associated with it, were devalued by these feminists.
Stage 3 is only just emerging in this past decade, and will, I predict, continue to develop and extend itself in the future. In Stage 3, individuals of both genders strive to heal themselves and reach wholeness, by seeking to live lives which integrate both paid and unpaid work. This is the stage of integrative feminism, which creating and combining a new kind of masculinity with a new kind of femininity;
1 revaluing the unpaid work in the home and life outside work in general; and extending new feminine principles of caring into the larger economy and polity.
. Viewed within this historical perspective, feminism's achievement of equal opportunity for women does not signify the end of feminism. Instead, it signifies a key step towards a more fully feminist economy. The next goal of feminist movement becomes the development and realization of
Stage 3 values, practices and institutions --a new kind of feminist economic transformation.
Complete discussion and documentation of the shift to Stage 3 is not within the scope of one journal article --I am currently working on a book with Barbara Brandt, tentatively entitled Healing Ourselves, Healing Our Economy, which takes on this task. Instead, in this article, I will focus on one key aspect of the shift --the changing organization of paid and unpaid work, and its allocation between the sexes. Since this research is evolving, I would very much appreciate feedback from readers on the concepts and interpretations presented below, as well as additional supportive data.
STAGE 1: SEPARATE SEXUAL SPHERES AND SOCIAL-HOMEMAKING FEMINISM
My readers are probably all familiar with the organization of work and its allocation between the sexes in the traditional capitalist patriarchal system, which emerged in the United States during the nineteenth century in urban areas, and probably had its heyday during the 1950s (in spite of strong signs of stress). Nevertheless, because the breakdown and transcendence of this system of work organization is the focus of this article, I will explore the "starting point" in some detail here, both conceptually and historically; more detail is available in my books (Matthaei 1982; Amott and Matthaei 1996) .
What was perhaps most strikingly different about the SDOL in Stage 1, as compared to the previous colonial family economy, was the emergence of separate sexually-defined spheres of activity, the "economy" and the "home." The "masculine" economic sphere and the "feminine" domestic sphere were separate and distinct in many ways, including their primary physical locations, their goals, the types of social relations involved, and the values associated with them (Matthaei 1982: Chs. 1-5) . All of these differences became aspects of gender differentiation in Stage 1.
As Stage 1 developed, commodity production --production for the market --gradually moved out of the household sphere, into a sphere organized by ever larger and more productive profit-motivated firms and mediated by monetary exchange. Subsistence production --production to fill the needs of family members --remained in the household, organized by family relationships.
As the household gradually shed its role in producing commodities, it also shed the non-family members it had employed in commodity production --slaves, hired hands, peons, etc. (but not personal servants); it became more properly a "home," the sphere of private, familial life (Matthaei 1982 : Chs. 5 and 6).
As the capitalist economy expanded, adult men were assigned to work in the new, marketorganized, outside-the-home "economic sphere" in which production for exchange, organized by the profit motive, took place. A minority were able to grow their family businesses into capitalist firms, becoming capitalists, while the majority of independent producers --failing family farmers, craftsmen, and shopkeepers --were driven into the wage labor force. Those proletarianized in this fashion were predominantly white men. Most men of color had been employed in slave, hacienda, or subsistence (Native American) production; as these production systems were displaced, men in these communities gradually entered the wage labor force, where they were segregated into secondary labor market jobs (Amott and Matthaei 1996: Ch. 9 ).
As capitalist production gradually triumphed, two key concepts emerged which came to define men's work in capitalist patriarchy: "bread-winning" and the "family wage."
The notion of men's work as bread-winning emphasizes its innately competitive quality, a quality which was associated with masculinity in previous times, but which comes to fuller fruition in capitalist patriarchy. Men compete with one another to win more "bread," i.e. more money.
Work as bread-winning becomes work with the goal either of exploiting other men for profit (as a capitalist), or at least of rising above them in the earnings hierarchy. Competition pervades the masculine economic sphere. Capitalists compete with other capitalists for greater market shares and profits, and compete with their workers over the wages to be paid. Workers compete with other workers for jobs, and for promotions. The new ideal for men becomes struggling to advance oneself in the "dog-eat-dog" economic world, in which everyone is out to get you (Matthaei 1982: Ch. 5 ).
This ideal was both racist and classist. White working-class men were proclaimed as relative losers in the competition. When their profit-hungry employers tried to replace them with lower-waged men of color and women, they organized in white-male-only unions, fighting for their own economic survival by excluding these other workers from the best working-class jobs (Williams 1987; Amott and Matthaei 1996 : Part II).
The second concept which came to organize men's work was the "family wage, " which became a central demand of unions in the late 19 th century (Hartmann 1979) . Key to the construction of gender has always been the need to differentiate oneself from the opposite sex. The family wage, which bread-winners strove for, was a wage high enough for a working man to support a non-employed wife and children. So men's competition for higher wages, their seeking to advance themselves in the economic hierarchy, was fueled by their need to be the sole support of their family.
White male workers expressed this dual purpose as they came together in unions to strengthen workers' hands in the struggle against capitalists, and to exclude other groups of workers (women and people of color) from their jobs, relegating them to an inferior subset of jobs (Williams 1987 ).
The latter efforts were a primary force in reconstituting racism after the breakdown of slavery and the plantation system, belying the operating myth in this period that the "best man" wins (Amott and Matthaei 1996: Part II) .
Emerging along with the family wage was the redefinition of women's work as "homemaking" in the "cult of domesticity." While there remained tremendous variation in the lives of women across race and class, nevertheless most married women shared the common experience of being "homemakers" in homes of their own. While most married white women had had independent homes of their own in colonial times, this was a new experience for most women of color. The abolition of slavery and the end of the hacienda system which accompanied the rise of capitalism extended to subordinated peoples of color the opportunity to establish independent households and homes of their own, freed from the control of a slave master or plantation owner (Amott and Matthaei 1996: Part II) .
Marriage, motherhood, and homemaking --in the sense of caring for her husband and children --were central to womanhood in Stage 1, as they had been in previous times. However, as
Stage 1 developed, the content of homemaking changed in many ways, and the values underlying it became more distinct and different from men's values. In contrast to men, who cared for their families by working outside the home and earning money, the overarching value or motive of women's homemaking work was to care for their families in their homes by nurturing and taking care of them, immediately and directly with their own efforts. Middle-and upper-class women did this with the help of servants (mostly unmarried white immigrant women and people of color), and all women did this increasingly with the help of consumer goods purchased with their husband's earnings (Matthaei 1982 : Chs 5 and 6).
As the "home" emerged as a private, familial sphere, it also gradually shed much of its production work, and became an arena of consumption. Plenty of hard physical work was at first still required of the homemakers and her aides. However, as store-bought goods (produced primarily by men in the factories of the paid economic sphere) became more available and affordable, women's subsistence production declined. Women took on a major new task --the job of purchasing most efficiently the food, clothing and other material goods that their families needed, using the income earned and passed on to them by their husbands.
As Stage 1 developed, women's traditional work of mothering was also radically transformed. In the earlier family economy, parenting had meant putting one's children to work as soon as they were able, at work appropriate to their sex and station --or having one's children be put to work by a slave master or plantation owner. Once commodity production left the household, childhood emerged as a distinct life stage, during which children were protected and nurtured in the home by their mothers, and went to school. The goal of a mother's homemaking efforts was to assure her children's future success: for boys, to be successful in the masculine economic competition and, for girls, to succeed at the feminine task of catching and keeping an appropriate husband. The mother was also expected to provide expert care for her husband, be it in the form of nourishing meals or emotional support, both of which improved his ability to compete in the economy. (Matthaei 1982: 106-114) .
These distinct new forms of women's work were recognized and lauded by what later feminist historians have termed "the cult of domesticity." As nineteenth century middle-class reformers of that day argued, a woman's place was in the home, in the domestic sphere, because only there could she use her unique, mothering abilities to perform the very important task of shaping the character of her children and supporting and humanizing her husband. (Matthaei 1982: Ch. 5 ).
This "cult of domesticity" notion, while propagated by the middle and upper classes, involved a shared goal across racial-ethnic and class groups to keep married women in the domestic sphere, out of the process of commodity production. To achieve this goal, working-class couples postponed marriage until the man's earnings were enough to support a homebound homemaker; poor families sent their children into the labor force; and married women took in boarders, laundry, engaged in subsistence production, or scrimped, saved, scavenged, and shopped for bargains. A final option, avoided when possible, was to send homemakers into paid work, often only part-time to allow time for homemaking work. Single women had the highest labor force participation rates --for example, in 1890, 40.5 % were counted as employed, versus 4.6% of married women (Matthaei 1982: 130) . For every racial-ethnic group, nonmarried women were much more likely to be in the labor force than married women. However, because of their husbands' exclusion from "family wage"
jobs, married women of color were much more likely to be in the paid labor force than married white women; in 1920, 32.5% of African American married women were in the paid labor force, compared to 6.5% of European American married women (Amott and Matthaei 1996: 306) .
Although some Stage 1 women thus "escaped" segregation into the domestic sphere, this was far from a liberation. When women entered paid work, they encountered rigid sex-race typing of jobs, which segregated them into lower-waged, dead-end jobs, many of them paid forms of homemaking. This sex-race-based assignment of jobs was rationalized by sexist and racist beliefs about the inherent and/or God-given differences and inequalities between the races and sexes. A significant share of women's paid work, particularly in the late nineteenth century, was performed in homes --by domestic servants in the homes of other women, or by laundresses and boarding/lodging house keepers in their own homes. Women's jobs lacked the potential upward mobility that came to characterize most white men's jobs (in the form of seniority or career ladders).
And even though some employed women were single mothers trying to support their families, women's jobs did not pay family wages (Amott and Matthaei 1996: Ch. 10 ).
It should also be emphasized that poor women and men, disproportionately people of color, were often unable to achieve the cult of domesticity ideal of husband as family-wage bread-winner and wife as full-time-homemaker. This fact did not weaken the cult of domesticity. To the contrary.
Prevailing classist and racist prejudices against the poor and people of color were supported by the fact that they were unable to fulfill their SDOL roles and act like "real women" and "real men."
Further, the desire by poor and middle-class families to keep their wives at home was fuelled by the classist and/or racist wishes not to appear poor or to be like people of color.
Most women's organizing in this period grew out of the idea of innate differences between the sexes, as expressed in the reigning ideology of separate spheres. On this basis, Stage 1 feminists argued that women should have political representation in order to express their special, feminine, caring values; that women should monopolize the emergent "caring" professions (teaching, social work, nursing); that women workers should benefit from special "protective legislation" when employed; and that the state should support women in the event that they became single mothers.
Women also organized as "social homemakers" to homemake for society at large ("society is but one large home," one social feminist claimed), seeking to humanize the masculine, competitive public sphere and protect their homes through the consumer, prohibition and settlement house movement, the Women's Trade Union League, and many others. Through this movement, women expressed their homemaking vocations through unpaid or "volunteer" work in the public sphere, aimed at balancing the latter's overly masculine, competitive, individualistic nature (Matthaei 1982: 173-177 The capitalist patriarchal system proved to be full of internal contradictions, which have led to an accelerating breakdown of one of its key principles, the sexual division of labor. This breakdown took the form not only of married women entering the paid labor force, but equally significant, of both single and married women breaking into and performing traditional "men's jobs."
While this movement was at first fueled by women striving to be better homemakers, in the latter half of this century it gradually became a movement of women striving to achieve success in masculine terms. Let me explain.
Elsewhere I have written extensively about the causes of married women's entrance into the labor force (Matthaei 1982: Chs. 10 and 11) . One major force has been the development of competitive consumerism.
Central to capitalism is the continual striving of firms to expand. Their ability to continue to grow is limited by the extent of their markets. In the U.S. starting in the 1920s, firms began to struggle to transcend the limits of consumer demand by developing active marketing strategies, which included not simply advertising, but the continual creation of new and "better" commodities to be advertised.
Besides its evident role in filling family needs, consumption also became an arena in which the "winnings" in men's breadwinning competition could be displayed. The desire to keep up with the Jones, or to surpass them, further fuelled the pressure on men to "win" more "bread." As labor productivity and standards of living rose during the first half of the twentieth century, families began to have the goal and expectation that they would be able to consume more, better, newer commodities in the future. Women homemakers struggling to "make ends meet" on their husbands' salaries began to respond to their families' unmet consumer needs by entering the paid labor force.
As dual-earner households were able to achieve rising living standards, traditional single-earner families now felt (relatively) more deprived. Finally, since the 1970s, the stagnant or declining real wages faced by most men has put further pressure on homemakers to enter the labor force (Matthaei 1982: Ch. 10 ).
I believe that competitive consumerism alone would not have succeeded in overturning the cult of domesticity. Since the wives of the most successful, wealthiest men felt the least pressure to earn income, then the entrance of married women into the labor force retained its class and race stigma. In other words, competitive consumerism primarily caused the wives of lower-paid, working-class men to go out to work. However, competitive consumerism was accompanied by a second development, competitive careerism, which began in the late nineteenth century and gathered steam throughout the twentieth century. Competitive careerism --the historical offspring of social homemaking and bread-winning --drew mostly white, privileged, married women into the labor force, countering the class and race stigma on married women's labor force participation.
Competitive careerism grew out of the movement to educate upper-class women to be better mothers. Vocal women proponents of the cult of domesticity argued that since women's mothering work was so essential to the future success of their children, women should receive some training for their mothering. In particular, if the sons of upper-class women were to be the future presidents and leaders of the country, their mothers needed higher education so as to prepare them for these roles.
During the late nineteenth century, upper-class colleges for women, such as Wellesley (where I teach) were founded to provide this training.
But once educated, many of these women wanted to use their newfound knowledge in professions, rather than retiring to the privacy of domestic married life. Since Stage 1 marriage required full-time domesticity, these "career women" at first were primarily unmarried (or left their paid careers at marriage), or lived with other women in "Boston marriages." They also maintained the cult of domesticity notion of distinct sexual spheres by entering the developing "feminine"
professions --teaching, social work, nursing, librarianship. However, as the twentieth century progressed, more and more college-educated women began to experiment with combining careers with marriage and mothering, as well as with taking on (or trying to take on) traditionally masculine careers such as medicine and law. (Matthaei 1982: Ch. 11)
The movement of married women into the labor force has also been fueled by the problems and risks of full-time homemaking, which became greater and more apparent during the course of the 20 th century. Women's economic dependence on their husbands was increasingly viewed as doubly problematic: for its tendency to create an inequality of power in the marriage relationship, and for the high risk of poverty that women and their children faced if they lost their husband-cum-provider through divorce, unemployment, or even death. This risk became more worrisome as the divorce rate rose exponentially, confronting homemakers with a one in two chance of divorce, and a one in two chance of living in poverty after divorce if they have children under 18 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998: 480). Table 2 (see page 38) shows that the labor force participation rates of married women have risen dramatically during the course of the twentieth century, from only 6 percent in 1900, to 31 percent in 1960, to an astounding 62 percent in 1997. Each succeeding cohort of women has been participating more than their mothers did, creating a snowball effect. While this shift has been most dramatic among white married women, it has occurred in all racial-ethnic groups (Amott and Matthaei 1996: 306) . Today, the cult of domesticity has been turned upside down: married women with children under 18 have higher participation rates than either single women or married women without children.
Stage 2 feminist movement which blossomed in the early 1970s was both an outgrowth of all these trends, as well as a contributor to them. This movement had many different subgroups, some of which involved a radical questioning of the principles of capitalism. However, as analyzed and described by Suzanne Gordon in her book Prisoners of Men's Dreams, the type of feminism which was most influential in this stage was "equal-opportunity feminism" --i.e. feminism which accepts the basic institutions and practices of capitalist patriarchy, but strives for women's equality with men given these institutions and practices. (Gordon 1991) The main thesis of equal-opportunity feminism has been that the arbitrary exclusion of women from the labor force, and especially from the higher paid, men's jobs, is unfair and discriminatory. Its main battle has been to win parity with men in the economy (and polity) --both by gaining access to men's jobs and by raising the wages of women's jobs. In contrast to Stage 1 feminists, who emphasized how women are different from men, equal opportunity feminists argue that women's abilities are equal to men's, and therefore women should not be restricted to the home and to low paid, women's jobs.
Stage 2 feminism takes as its foundation the desirability of married women's employment, because it provides economic independence, thus undermining the inequality inherent in traditional marriage and allowing women in unsatisfactory marriages to leave them By advocating women's entrance into the masculine labor market competition, equal-opportunity feminism has gradually transformed the Stage 1 masculine goal of bread-winning into a unisex version --competitive careerism --in which both sexes have the right and responsibility to support themselves and their families financially.
In sharp contrast with Stage 1, which affirmed the natural difference and complementarity of men and women and therefore the appropriateness of a sexual division of labor, Stage 2 affirms the similarity of men and women and the oppressive, discriminatory nature of the SDOL. Feminist attacks on sex discrimination followed on the heels of successful Civil Rights struggles, creating a double-pronged attack on the Stage 1 principle of ascribed inequality based on sex and race. The
Equal Pay Act of 1964 required employers to pay women and men equal wages when they did the same jobs. During the same year, the exclusion of women from "masculine" jobs was made illegal when "sex" was added to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an act which had already banned employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion and national origin. In addition, Executive
Order 11246, first issued in 1965 and amended in 1967, ordered all employers with federal contracts or subcontracts to take "affirmative action" to employ classes of workers --women and minorities --in jobs they had previously been excluded from. Thus, not only equal opportunity between the sexes, but also equality of representation of the sexes throughout the job hierarchy became mandated policy goals. 3 During the ensuing decades, women gradually gained access to all job categories and pushed ever upward on the "glass ceiling" that still excluded them from the highest-paid, highest-status positions.
Further, responding to the needs of women segregated into traditional feminine jobs and hence not covered by the Equal Pay Act, equal-opportunity feminists launched "comparable worth"
campaigns. These campaigns sought to overturn the Stage 1 male-only family-wage system by fighting for pay for women's jobs equal to the pay men received for jobs which required comparable skills, efforts, and working conditions. Feminist union activists fought for the inclusion of comparable worth demands in union bargaining platforms, while feminist activists pressured state governments to pay their employees according to the principle of comparable worth. Both unions and state governments responded, and by 1988, twenty states had made some comparable worth adjustments to their pay scales (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 1998: 24) .
The sexual division of labor in paid work proved at first quite resistant to change, partly because a large share of the women entering the labor force took traditionally feminine jobs, especially in the burgeoning clerical occupations. However, women's gradually growing commitment to the paid labor force, along with the active efforts of Stage 2 feminists, eventually began to pay off (sic!). Although the index of occupational segregation by sex changed little in the decades before 1960, it declined substantially during the 1970s and 1980s (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 1996: 131) . These changes in the overall degree of sex segregation resulted primarily from women's entrance into previously male-dominated jobs, particularly in management and the professions, rather than from men moving into women's jobs. Dramatic transformations took place in certain highly visible, high-status masculine professions. For example, in 1960 women earned only 6 percent of medical degrees and 3 percent of law degrees; by 1991 these shares had increased to 36
and 43 percent respectively (Amott and Matthaei 1996: 351) . These movements of women into men's jobs combined with the decline in men's real wages to decrease the "wage gap" between the sexes. The average earnings of full-time women as a percentage of those of comparable men had stayed around 59% from the early 60s to the early 80s (the famous 59 cents that women earned for every dollar that men did); by 1995, full-time women's average earnings rose to 71% of men's by 1995 (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 1998: 135) .
There is no doubt that Stage 2 represented a liberation for women --a liberation from the rigid restrictions of the sexual division of labor, which for centuries has confined them to work of less value and power than men. But Stage 2 has also represented the triumph of two types of competition, which feed one another: competitive consumerism and competitive careerism.
Competitive consumerism --the drive to consume more and more, to keep up with or surpass the Jones --requires more and more income, spurring both men and women to compete in the labor force for the better paid jobs. And one's success in the labor force competition is displayed to others by one's high levels of consumption, which spurs many families to spend far beyond their means, taking on huge debt burdens. When married women flooded into the labor force in the course of this century, I suggest that they did so as much to fulfill the dictates of competitive consumerism and competitive careerism as in search of their own liberation.
In other words, Stage 2 both represents a liberation for women, and a triumph of masculine values. Accompanying the shift to Stage 2 , a distinctly new set of values for women emerged, which could be boiled down to a simple goal: to be equal to men, in the workplace, polity, and family. So women's Stage 2 values in fact translated into earning as much money as possible in the economy. The "successful" Stage 2 woman was the woman who breaks the glass ceiling, the first woman CEO of a company, the powerful and high-paid woman lawyer or doctor. Women who decided to pursue their careers at the expense of having children or even married life itself were still considered successes. By taking on the goal of competitive careerism, women were essentially accepting the preeminence of masculine sphere activities over unpaid work in the home. And when they focused their homemaking efforts on competitive consumerism, women bought into the belief that purchased goods and services fill needs better than human relationships --i.e. that there was no special value to the caring activities that had been defined as feminine. Similarly, the Stage 1 social homemaker was eclipsed by women seeking the valuation of wages for their public work.
Stage 2 feminists --and the many women who did not call themselves feminists, but took on masculine values --also decried the dependent and isolated position of the full-time homemaker.
Stage 1's ideal woman, whose dedication to homemaking (and her husband's adequate earnings) caused her to forego labor force participation, became described as "just a housewife."
What happened to housework, childrearing, unpaid caring labor in general, in Stage 2?
Homemaking and childrearing were still defined as women's work; men weren't struggling to do them, and indeed most felt less than manly if they did. As a result, the commodification of homemaking work increased. Not only did employed women purchase goods, such as prepared or restaurant meals, that replaced their own cooking labor, they also found others (almost all women) to do their childcare --nannies, family day care providers, day care center workers, or relatives. They also had fewer children: between 1955 and 1996 the birth rate fell by 40% (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998: 76). So the time spent on unpaid, caring, homemaking work in the home shrunk significantly, as women shifted their time from unpaid work towards paid work.
Stage 2 feminists celebrated this change as a liberation from the drudgery of housework. As feminist economist Barbara Bergmann argued in her book, The Economic Emergence of Women, (1986: Ch. 12) since housework is unpaid and devalued, whoever does it becomes less valued monetarily and socially. Since most men will naturally, out of self-interest, refuse to take on an equal share of such devalued work, women will always end up doing more of it. However, women's struggle for equality with men required dedication to their jobs (and sometimes even the services a homemaker of one's own). Thus, says Bergmann, the only way to achieve gender parity in the labor force is to free wage-earning women from homemaking, by commoditizing unpaid work to the fullest extent.
Although most people in Stage 2 would find Bergmann's views extreme, the fact that for almost twenty years the majority of married women with children have been in the labor force has essentially destroyed the cult of domesticity. Stage 1 notions that a mother's employment was bad for her children all but evaporated. All adults, men or women, were now viewed as responsible for financially supporting themselves. These were important achievements.
However, the devaluation of unpaid caring work that accompanied the destruction of the cult of domesticity has contributed to several problematic developments First, men have come to feel less responsible for staying with and financially supporting their wives, contributing both to the higher divorce rate as well as to low rates of child support and alimony payment. Second, Stage 2's devaluation of unpaid, caring work has contributed to the loss of public support for welfare payments to single mothers. Originally created to allow mothers without husbands to achieve the cult of domesticity ideal of full-time mothering, the welfare social safety net was wiped out in 1996
when President Clinton fulfilled his campaign promise "to eliminate welfare as we know it." This reflects the Stage 2 assumption that unpaid homemaking is of no value, and that all women, even those with small children, must have paid jobs. Another Stage 2 casualty has been the decline in women going into the traditional caring professions, as women's popular books and magazines such as Working Woman downgraded professions such as nursing, teaching, and social work and explicitly discouraged women from entering them. By the late 1980s, this factor, along with the comparably low wages earned in these professions, had resulted in serious shortages in the fields of both teaching and nursing (Gordon 1991: 132-40) .
Another major problem created in Stage 2 is the "double day." Women entered the paid labor force without shedding their responsibility for the unpaid work of housework and childcare.
Particularly severe for employed single mothers, the double day has also been a serious problem for married mothers. While at first some women tried to hold onto homemaking activities as their special province, increasing numbers have sought relief and help from their husbands. The reticence of Stage 2 men to give up their privileged, waited-on position in their homes to take on unpaid work that was feminine, feminizing, and devalued has exacerbated conflicts between the sexes that were more covert in Stage 1. Women have been angered by men's traditional, patriarchal behavior that involves putting themselves and their jobs first, ordering women around, and viewing them as inferior in the economic and political spheres. Women have been angered by the double day, and men's resistance to "helping" with cooking, cleaning, and/or childcare. With roles up in the air, spouses find themselves fighting about who does the housework, cooking, childcare; whose job or career is more important? Men are put on the defensive, their traditional masculinity challenged both at home and at paid work, where they are forced for the first time to compete with women and, for white men, with people of color; according to the dictates of sexism and racism, losing to either of these groups would destroy their masculinity.
A final problem with Stage 2 feminism was that it was defined and led by white middle-and upper-class women, and exacerbated racial and class tensions among women. While Stage 2 feminism portrayed itself as "the women's movement," it was based on an experience of womanhood that was white and middle-class (Hooks 1984; Josephs 1986) . Those working class women, disproportionately women of color, whose husbands' low wages or unemployment had already forced them into low-paid, dead-end jobs had difficulty understanding the Stage 2 feminist view of jobs as liberating for women. Women of color, whose family systems had sustained waves of attacks by the white-controlled power structure, and who experienced their families as a refuge against racist white society as well as a locus of gender oppression, had difficulty identifying with
Stage 2 (white) feminists critiques of "the family" (Glenn 1985) . The Stage 2 goal of equality with "men" had less resonance for women of color, whose men were subordinated to white men and, in some cases, to white women in the economic hierarchy. While working class women of all races benefited from equal opportunity feminism's attack on sex discrimination by increasing their representation in the higher-paid, masculine blue collar jobs, class barriers made access to the elite, white masculine jobs an impossibility for most working class women and women of color, affirmation action notwithstanding. Thus, the entrance of increasing numbers of middle-and upperclass, predominantly white, married women into the higher-paid masculine jobs increased the income inequality among families. The case of Zoe Baird, Clinton's first choice for Attorney General, exemplifies the racial and class contradictions of Stage 2 feminism. Baird was a high-powered white lawyer whose nomination ran aground when it was revealed that she had not paid the required social security taxes for her nanny, an undocumented Latina immigrant. As we saw above, the Stage 2 solution to the double day was replacing homemaking tasks with commodity equivalents purchased with women's earning --day care or nannies, restaurant or precooked meals, house cleaners, et cetera. However, it soon became clear that one's entire private life and family life could not be replaced with commodity equivalents. Women tried to enlist the "help" of their husbands with housework and childcare, and, in spite of the resistance discussed above, men gradually began to spend more time at them. According to one study, between 1977 and 1997, the average amount of time that a working father spent with his children increased about 6 hours per week, and his time spent at other household chores also increased (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997: 40-44) . As men became more and more involved in parenting, they began fighting for custody or joint custody of their children upon divorce; there were almost 4 million single-father families in 1997, about 6 percent of all families, an unprecedented proportion (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998: 61).
In this way, the double day problem is gradually shifting from a "women's problem" to become a problem for both women and men, and for families. In response, many parents take on alternating work shifts so that one parent is always home with the children. Another response has been speeding up the pace of one's work at home or on the job so as to try to get more done in less time. "Multitasking" --doing a variety of tasks, perhaps even paid and unpaid, at the same time --is one form of speed up (for example, reading one's email at home while "watching" the kids). These responses have contributed to the much-discussed modern problem of "stress"; one study found that 92% of employed women described themselves as somewhat or extremely pressed. hours more per year on average, and full-time women were working an average of 305 more hours per year (Schor 1991: 29) . Her findings were confirmed by a 1997 study which found that the average workweek rose from 43.6 hours in 1977 to 47.1 hours in 1997 (Bond, Galinsky and Swanberg 1997: 73) . In this twenty-year period, women's average workweek increased from 39 to 44 hours, while men's increased from 47 to 50 hours (Ibid: 73). Schor found that average yearly work hours of full-time workers, including those that employers did not pay workers for, increased from 2675 in 1969 to 2837 in 1987 (Schor 1991: 35) . For wage workers these increases took the form of paid overtime; for salaried workers, the unpaid extension of hours, often up to a total work week of 60, 80 or even more hours (Kelly 1998; Lewis 1998) . Indeed, some studies have found that the increase in the work week is concentrated among managerial and professional workers (Jacobs and Gerson 1998).
In sum, Stage 2 living has involved unforeseen costs, especially in the areas of personal health and well-being. The problems of speed-up, stress, lack of time to sleep and just "hang out,"
and exhaustion, which already plagued the working poor, have begun to reduce the quality of life of middle and upper class individuals, causing their health and sense of well-being to decline. Growing numbers of individuals caught in the stress and imbalance of Stage 2 living are realizing the unhealthiness of their life styles. "One-third of Americans say they always feel rushed, just over one-third say that their lives are out of control, {and} two-thirds say they want more balance," noted economist Juliet Schor in The Overspent American (Schor 1998: 114) . Many women who begin mothering in a Stage 2 fashion find, often unexpectedly, that they miss their children, or feel less than adequate as parents. One employed mother described her children as "growing up rushed and redirected by a tired, frustrated, distracted mother." (Stone 1998 : 4) With gender boundaries relaxed, more and more men begin to feel the same way --questioning the costs of their stressed-out, paid-work-dominated lifestyles (Real 1997; Saltzman 1991) .
Often this questioning process begins with a crisis --a child's illness or alienated behavior; intractable marital conflicts regarding household and childcare responsibilities; the joyless states of depression, anxiety and sleep-disorders that have sky-rocketed during Stage 2; an out-of-control addiction to alcohol, drugs, shopping, food, or even work; a stress-related illness such as a heart attack; a sudden firing or bankruptcy. Other times, there is a gradual realization that one's lifestyle is not fulfilling, and needs to be changed. Thus a variety of forces are leading both women and men to stop "business as usual," take a look at their lives, and start looking for healthier and more balanced ways of living (Real 1997; Salzman 1991; Gordon 1991) . And, after Stage 2's successful challenging of the rigid gender roles, everything is up for grabs.
What are the results of this growing soul-searching? It is difficult to obtain "hard data" on these shifts, and given present institutional constraints, most are showing themselves as a preference for change rather than as actual changes in behavior. But it is clear from recent polls that a majority of Americans feels that the solution to the time bind is to reduce hours at paid work. A recent study showed that, in 1997, 63% of all employees would like to work fewer hours at paid work, if they could, up from 47% in 1992; both men and women would like to reduce their paid work by about 11
per week (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997: 73-4) . The same study found that 70 percent of mothers and fathers feel they do not have enough time to spend with their children (Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg 1997: 42) . A Catalyst study cited in the Wall Street Journal found that 65% of men and 72% of women in two-earner couples would like to "sequence" their careers, working less during "family-focussed stages of life" and then speeding up as their children became more independent, "with no prejudice from their employers" (Shellenbarger 1998b) .
It is important to point out that this desire to reduce paid work is not a desire to return to the polarized gender roles of Stage 1. Recent polls of women show that the large majority is committed to having paid jobs (and indeed, labor force participation rates of women have continued to increase). 64 are now in the labor force, and plan to stay there: but the majority of those in the labor force would like to reduce their hours in paid work so they can have more time for unpaid activities.
especially during the years when parenting demands are high. The sexes are becoming more similar:
a new kind of integrated individual is wanting to be born, one with a job that can support them financially, and time outside that job for the "unpaid work" of family care, leisure, community participation, and just being.
Doing less paid work, however, has the clear result of less pay, and hence of a lower standard of living in terms of goods and services. For the millions of low-wage workers, cutting back on expenditures isn't a real option, even if they would like to work less. Money remains more important, on the margin, than more free time; indeed, many are working multiple jobs to make ends meet, and are forced to leave their children unattended after school. One solution is higher wages at the bottom. In the 1990s, community-labor alliances around the U.S. have waged successful "living wage campaigns," which ask local governments to require that contractors pay their workers a wage sufficient to live on, considerably higher than the minimum wage. Living wage ordinances have been passed in Los Angeles and New York City, among others (Pollin and Luce 1998) . I see these campaigns as a Stage 3 version of family-wage organizing in the nineteenth century --the Stage 3 solution is to advocate wages high enough to live on for all workers, not just for men.
As a result of the time crunch, middle-and upper-class families who have the financial slack to reduce their paid work hours are beginning to do so. A 1995 survey found that 28% of all respondents had "downshifted" during the last five years --i.e. "had voluntarily made changes in their life which resulted in making less money" (not including regularly scheduled retirements) --by reducing their work hours, changing to a lower paying job, or quitting work to stay at home. Both sexes were involved in downshifting, with men comprising a surprising 40% of downshifters (Harwood Group 1995: 18) . Indeed, a 1989 poll found that 8 out of 10 respondents were willing to sacrifice career advancement to be able to spend more time with their families (Saltzman 1991: 17) .
The second core value that Americans are confronting as they struggle to reduce their work hours is competitive consumerism. Through advertising, corporations have successfully convinced both women and men that they "need" the level of goods and services that they have been consuming, and indeed much more, to be good, upstanding, "successful" human beings; that their love for their children and friends is best expressed by the amount of money that they spend on them; During the same period, a growing number of "successful" men were also quitting highlypaid, high-status careers in order to be able to spend with their families. Their stories also received considerable public attention and press coverage (Saltzman 1991; Shellenbarger 1998b ). The participation of growing numbers of men in downshifting is transforming the "female labor force drop-out" story to a story of both women and men rejecting the reigning view of success as "winning" the job with the highest earnings, by doing "whatever it takes," as well as rejecting the belief that caring for your family means spending as much money as possible on them (Shellenbarger 1998a) . As Peter Cappelli wrote in The New Deal of Work, "employees … are much less willing to work themselves to death" (Kaufman 1999 : A-1). As a female downshifter cited in the "Yearning for Balance" study explained:
As I started climbing the corporate ladder, I really decided that I was hating it more and more, and I was bringing more and more work home…I was already hiring people to Many downshifters are unable to renegotiate lower hours jobs with their existing employer, and hence find themselves changing employers and jobs. Some move "down" within the existing job hierarchy, or create a new spot in it for themselves through self-employment --getting off the fast track, for example, or starting a home-based business (see Saltzman 1991) . Others simply drop out of the work force, relying on the earnings and health benefits provided by an employed partner. A key institutional problem preventing people from downshifting is the loss of benefits, especially health insurance, that occurs with self-employment and often accompanies part-time work. Part-time jobs (less than 35 hours weekly) were constructed in Stage 1 as women's jobs; and as part of that legacy, today's part-time workers are about half as likely as full-time workers to receive some kind of access to health insurance through their primary job (Bond, Galinsky and Swanberg 1997: 88) .
Individuals who downshift to different, part-time jobs usually also suffer a cut in hourly earnings, responsibilities, and job prestige (Tilly 1996) .
Because of such problems, employees who live the double day have also been pressuring their employers to accommodate their desires to better integrate their family and work lives, and since the mid-1980s, a small but growing share of firms have begun to respond to these demands with "family-friendly policies." On-site or near-site day care, flextime, and flexplace can be seen as the beginning of the Stage 3 shift, in their acknowledgement of workers' rights to attend to family responsibilities. While these policies do not actually free up hours for unpaid work, they pose a radical challenge to the conventional concept that workers' only allegiance is to their employers --by recognizing that workers have lives and responsibilities outside of their jobs, and by allowing workers to structure job hours and place around these outside responsibilities. In 1997, an estimated 11% of employers provided an on-site or near-site childcare center for their workers' use (Bond, Galinsky and Swanberg 1997: 94) . In 1997, 18% of people doing work for pay did some of this work at home, 6 and 28% of full-time workers had flexible schedules (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998: 413).
Such "family-friendly" responses by firms stem from a variety of reasons, including the traditional profit motive and the changing needs and demands of the workforce. Management consultants and policy analysts cite extensive research which documents that when workers' needs and lives outside of work are supported, employers benefit through higher worker morale and performance and reduced absenteeism and turn-over, which translate into higher productivity, lower costs, and, ultimately, higher profits (Radcliffe Public Policy Institute 1998; Bond, Galinsky and outside of work, companies are also realizing that workers who work less can actually get more done, because being less stressed out and having more balanced lives allows them to be more productive overall. The article highlighted SAS Institute, a computer software company in an industry notorious for the high number of hours clocked by its salaried workforce. SAS decided to restrict the weekly hours of its employees --including its CEO --first to 40, and then to 35 hours a week, shutting down its switchboard at 5 p.m. and its gate an hour later. The result has been more alert programmers, millions of dollars saved due to extremely low employee turn-over, and doubledigit sales growth. Originally viewed as crazy by their competitors, SAS is now receiving numerous visits from firms interested in duplicating their success story. The article also cites companies that discourage employees from checking their email and voicemail over the weekend, use an informal buddy system to check in on employees to make sure that they have gone home, and encourage co-workers to applaud a staff member who leaves early to take time with a family member (Kaufman 1999 ).
Such shorter work hour experiments are not limited to managerial and professional jobs. A plant manager unable to fill vacancies at his plastics factory took the advice of Ron Healey, a business consultant, and offered workers 30 hours of work for 40 hours pay; applications from highly qualified workers flooded his office, and productivity rose impressively. Other companies in Indiana --in plastics, machining, auto parts, and electronics --have implemented Healy's plan, also with positive results (Gardner 1997) . And some employers are offering their employees part-time jobs with good pay (equal to full time workers' hourly pay), full benefits, and opportunities for promotion (Bravo 1995: 62-3) .
Labor unions are also increasingly putting forward work/family provisions in their contract negotiations. A 1997 report by the Radcliffe Public Policy Institute described how unions are now demanding, and winning, child-care and elder-care support, paid parental and family leave, flexible work schedules, compressed workweeks, and part-time return to work after childbirth or adoption (Grundy and Firestein 1997) . Unions are responding to the changing needs of their members by seeking to reduce mandatory overtime. Indeed, this goal is now one of the "pillars" of the UAW's negotiating strategy. And in 1998 the CWA won a 50% cut in mandatory overtime by January 2001;
time-and-a-half, one union official said, doesn't compensate for the fact that workers feel "they don't have a life" (Kaufman 1999: C8) .
Even high schools are getting into the work/family act, helping prepare the next generation for an adulthood that balances paid and unpaid work. Education officials in many states have developed work/family curricula, as have many teachers. More than 3,000 high schools are using a series of books called "Career Choices" that emphasizes work-life issues. The series' female publisher explained, "We were the first pioneers going through the pass. Now, as mentors for these young people, we can say you can consciously make these choices" (Shellenbarger 1999b ).
For shorter work time to become a reality across the job hierarchy, however, public policy initiatives are required. Thus far, firms have been taking the lead in this area, with government far behind. In 1993, President Clinton finally signed into law the Family and Medical Leave Act , which allows workers in companies with over 50 employees to take unpaid leaves of up to 12 weeks, with continued health care coverage, and without losing their positions or suffering a cut in pay upon returning. However, this legislation still leaves the U.S. far behind our European counterparts, most of whom mandate extended paid parental leaves.
Stage 3 feminists and public policy advocates are pressuring the government for more. In
The Overworked American, Schor argues that in order to equalize shorter work time across classes, employers must be forced to respond to workers' desires through government mandated 4 or 6 week paid vacations, and 6 month paid parental leaves ( Schor 1991:150) . Feminist lawyer and political scientist Mona Harrington, writing out of the need to construct new "Liberal" policies which promote both caring within families, as well as women's equality in the larger economy and polity, challenges "the reigning idea that the sole corporate responsibility is to create value for shareholders." She advocates taxation policies to redistribute the highly inequitable share of income now going to shareholders and corporate managers into programs which support families and care: more and better child care, higher wages for child care workers, expanded and improved home health care for elders and the chronically ill or disabled, universal health insurance, early childhood education, afterschool programs, and income supplements for low-income families (Harrington 1999: 153) .
And in a unique mix of radical politics and economics with cultural conservatism, economist and pro-parent activist Sylvia Ann Hewlett, and political activist and philosopher Cornel West challenge what they see as modern society's "war against parents." They claim that the essential unpaid loving, nurturing work of parenting --done by both mothers and fathers --is increasingly being squeezed by the demands of the market and by the inequitable wage distribution. They emphasize the desire of millions of men today for more economic and social support so they can be "loving, attached parents" who are more personally involved in parenting and family life. Hewlett and West propose a "Parents' Bill of Rights," which could include such policies as family friendly workplaces, paid parenting leave for both parents, a social safety net, a living wage, tax benefits for families with children, special supports for fathers, widespread affordable quality day care, and greater symbolic and cultural recognition of parents and the unpaid work they do. (Hewlett and West 1998: Ch.6, 7 and 9 ). that it is loving, mutually-reaffirming connections with other people and with nature that are most fulfilling --not "things." For example, the "Yearning for Balance" poll found 66% of respondents said they would be much more satisfied with their lives if they had more time with family and friends, and 47% if they "were doing more to make a difference" in their communities. By contrast, only 21% said they would be much more satisfied if they had a nicer car, 19% if they had a bigger house or apartment, and 15% if they had "more nice things" in their homes . The study concluded that "people's deepest aspirations are non-material" (Harwood Group 1995: 15 are being drawn to seek to affect economic and political institutions, not only to support the Stage 3 policy changes discussed above, but also in order to safeguard themselves and their families in an era when health, well-being, and security are being threatened by things happening outside of their homes: environmental destruction, ruthless corporate downsizing and relocation, a media which glamorizes violence, and a plethora of other social problems.
As we have seen above, patriarchal capitalism was constructed on the restriction of caring to women and to the feminine sphere of the family; the economy was constructed as a "dog-eat-dog" world, organized by profit-motivated, masculine self-interested entrepreneurs and bread-winning workers. Stage 3 individuals are beginning to redefine these roles by integrating into them caring for others and awareness of one's effect on the larger society and planet, feminine principles which were restricted to the home when capitalist patriarchy was constructed in Stage 1. I call this new Stage 3 activity "socially-responsible individualism."
Stage 3 individuals are beginning to redefine and "feminize" entrepreneurship by transforming it into "socially responsible business," in which the masculine profit motive coexists with or occasionally is even replaced by the new feminine goal of service to others --consumers, workers, and the larger community (Harman and Hormann 1990; Bollier 1996) . Profits become the means to the end of service to others, rather than vice versa. Such entrepreneurship is behind household names like Ben and Jerry's ice cream, Tom's of Maine's toothpaste, and Paul Newman's range of products.
We have seen above how individuals have begun to reject competitive careerism because of its toll on one's life outside of paid work. As Stage 3 individuals combine caring and paid work, this is also leading some to view their paid work in new ways. Increasingly, both men and women are seeking work that is meaningful to them --as the development and expression of their special abilities. A plethora of self-help books and workshops now aid individuals who are trying to find self-expression and positive meaning in their jobs, to express their "soul at work." (Jarow 1995) . It bears pointing out that such a revisioning of paid work is in stark contrast to the traditionally masculine activity of competitive careerism, in which one's only goal was to earn more than others, and in which one's relationship to other workers, unless they were in one's union, was as a competitor. Indeed, Stage 3 individuals are finding that what is meaningful to them is often work which makes a contribution to helping others and advancing society at large (Everett 1999 ). This view of work, which integrates new masculine and new feminine principles, is expressed by futurist Barbara Marx Hubbard as the "impulse to express our unique creativity in such a way that we evolve ourselves and our world" (1996; see also 1998).
Stage 3 socially responsible individualism is also beginning to create a new commitment to affecting the larger world through political action. As we saw above, the "Yearning for Balance" Poll found that 47% of those surveyed said that they would be much more satisfied with their lives if they "were doing more to make a difference" in their communities (Harwood Group 1995: 15) . A book about people who followed the "Your Money of Your Life" program found that many of them used some of their increased free time to participate more actively in their communities (Blix and Heitmiller 1997) . Further, several studies of cases in which employers gave their employees well-paying, stable reduced-hours jobs found that workers used some of their extra time to become more involved in community activities (Negrey 1993: 93-95, 109-111) .
One innovative and powerful way that individuals are injecting their caring for themselves and for others into the larger public sphere is through the movements for socially responsible consumption and investment (really "voting with their dollars," as depicted by mainstream economists!). These movements urge people to use their purchasing power and investment dollars to pressure firms to be socially responsible --by supporting firms that are "green" (environmentally friendly), family-friendly, feminist and anti-racist, uninvolved in military, cigarette or alcohol production, worker-owned, etc. (Co-op America 1999; Hutton, D'Antonio and Johnsen 1998).
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Because these movements organize consumers and investors to choose on criteria other than simply the competitiveness of the price or the profitability of the investment, they in turn motivate firms to organize their production around goals other than simple cost minimization/profit maximization, thus supporting the movement for socially responsible entrepreneurship. The power of these movements is already evident in the growing number of firms, both traditional and alternative, that advertise their products as "green" or "socially responsible." Socially responsible investment and consumption stand in stark contrast to the competitive consumerism of Stages 1 and 2, in which individualistic goals to "keep up with the Jones'" or show off one's growing affluence prevailed, making consumers easy targets for marketing campaigns of profit-and growth-motivated firms. In Stage 3, individuals'
and families' investment and consumption choices support their true self-interest in a safe, sustainable, healthy, and just economy and society.
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Bringing of the feminine principle of caring for self and others into the economy and polity also comes full circle back into the home. In Stage 3, instead of striving to prepare ones' children to compete at all costs for money and power, parenting shifts to helping them find their unique ways both to express themselves and to serve society at large. Society's stake in supporting the unpaid work of "socially responsible parenting," through parent education and support services, paid parental leaves and shorter work week policies, and through affordable high quality day care and education, becomes clear.
CONSOLIDATING STAGE 3: TOWARDS A NEW INTEGRATIVE FEMINISM
My conclusion is that the task of contemporary ---i.e. Stage 3 --feminism is to advocate for the individual and institutional transformations described above. I term this task "integrative by the fact that its potential supporters include men as well as women, people of all social classes, people of color and whites, gays and straights. In this way, both in its movement building and in its desired outcomes, integrative feminism strives to heal not only the individual and the gender split, but also the economic and social rifts based on class, race, sexual preference, and other invidious distinctions that were the result of the traditional competitive masculinity of Stages 1 and 2. Bailyn (1993) .
ENDNOTES:
1 See Julie Nelson (1996) for an insightful discussion of the ways in which masculinity and femininity are "perverted" when lived out as mutually exclusive principles, as they are in Stage 1 and Stage 2.
2 Still, marital status "trumped" race in that the share of unmarried white women in the labor force was higher than that of married African American women.
3 However, affirmative action policies have gradually been gutted as a result of conservative attacks beginning in the early 1990s, which emphasized the racial aspect of affirmative action and cast these policies as "reverse discrimination."
4 For more on the limitations of Stage 2 feminism, see Matthaei (1996) .
5 See also Saltzman (1991 ) Schor (1998 ) for studies of downshifters. The 1996 survey cited in Schor found that 19% of those polled had downshifted voluntarily, and 12% had done so involuntarily; of the latter group, a quarter had found this to be "a blessing in disguise" (113).
6 Unfortunately, this flexibility regarding the location of work is a double-edged sword, since individuals who bring work home lose the boundary between family time and paid work, and often do extra, unpaid hours of work for their paid jobs in this way --such as checking their email late at night.
7 Co-Op America, for example, is an organization which sees itself as a "crucial link between active consumers and an economy based on cooperation, a concern for the environment, and social justice." It provides its members with the National Green Pages, which lists what it calls "Green Businesses" --including workerowned companies and environmentally "worker-owned companies" and "producers of energy-efficient and non-toxic products," which it urges its members to buy from. 
